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Free Press-Fair Trial: Restrictive 
Orders Mter Nebraska Press 
BY DouG RENDLEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mary Quill, a reporter for the Trumpet, covers a federal 
suit in which John Grey seeks to enjoin the county prosecutor 
from commencing a state criminal prosecution which Grey has 
alleged will be brought in bad faith and to harass. Much of the 
evidence which will be introduced in the federal proceeding will 
be inadmissible in any state criminal prosecution. Conse-
quently, to prevent the federal evidence from prejudicing po-
tential state jurors, federal Judge Pinball announces in court: 
"Subject to the sanctions provided by law for violation, no 
newspaper, radio or television station, or any other news media 
may report the testimony taken or any of the evidence admit-
ted or presented during this trial." 
These facts are similar to those presented in United States 
v. Dickinson. 1 The reporters in Dickinson had their articles 
published and were found guilty of contempt for breaching the 
district court's order. The court of appeals subsequently held 
the order constitutionally infirm. But, because the contempt 
hinged on whether the reporters intentionally flouted the order 
and not on whether the order was constitutional, the court of 
appeals approved a contempt sanction. The district judge, on 
remand to reconsider whether to impose contempt in light of 
the order's invalidity, persisted with the contempt sanction.2 
When the reporters lodged a second appeal, the court of ap-
peals found that the earlier appeal stated the law of the case 
and affirmed the contempt.3 The Supreme Court denied the 
reporters' petition for certiorari.4 
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author thanks Janet Dun-
lop who assisted in preparing this article. 
1 465 F.2d 496, 499-500 (5th Cir.), on remand, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), 
aff'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). 
2 United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 
373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). 
3 United States v. Dickinson, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1972), (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). 
4 For a critical article which focuses on Dickinson, see Rendleman, Free 
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Much has happened in regard to restrictive orders since 
Dickinson. The major occurrence has been the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 5 
which restricted judicial restraints on the dissemination of 
material about public trials. The American Bar Association 
House of Delegates adopted a set of procedures for restrictive 
orders in 19766 and, in 1978, after considering Nebraska Press 
fully, rendered some of the procedures obsolete with a revised 
set of standards.7 Other activity in the field has been created 
by lower courts which continue to grant restrictive orders and 
scholars who persist in commenting.8 
The problems in the free press-fair trial area are intracta-
ble. In an attempt to understand these problems differently, if 
not better, this article explores some of the recent develop-
ments in restrictive orders.9 Specifically, the comments will 
focus on criminal courts' power to impose restrictive orders, the 
procedure that courts utilize, procedural channels to, and 
availability of, review of the merits, the collateral bar rule, and 
problems in substantive law. Some generalizations concerning 
the judicial process will also emerge. 
Two points must be made before beginning. The first is a 
brief description of a restrictive order. Restrictive orders in a 
criminal context result from the trial judge's conscientious con-
cern to preserve for defendants an untainted trial. Restrictive 
orders limit publicity by restricting the dissemination of infor-
mation. To be distinguished are trial orders such as sequestra-
tion, continuance, and voir dire, which manipulate nonpublic-
ity aspects of the judicial process. Unlike the orders in the 
Press-Fair Trial: Review of Silence Orders, 52 N.C.L. REv. 127 (1973) . 
• 427 u.s. 539 (1976). 
I ABA, RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMODATE RIGHTS-OF FAIR TruAr. AND 
FREE PREss (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA REcoMMENDATIONS]. 
7 ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE $MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR 
TruAr. AND FREE PREss (2d ed., Tent. Draft, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA 
STANDARDS]. 
3 See, e.g., Symposium-Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 
383 (1977). 
1 I use "restrictive order" for two reasons. First, it is general enough to include 
orders sealing transcripts and closing proceedings, in contrast to a silence order which 
connotes more narrowly an order forbidding someone from disseminating something 
he already knows. Second, it is not a rhetorical effort to invoke sympathy; and it 
neither, like "protective order," cloaks the order in rectitude, nor, like "gag order," 
identifies the order as undesirable. 
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Mary Quill hypothetical and in Dickinson, most restrictive 
orders are entered in criminal prosecutions. 
The orders take many forms. Silence orders forbidding the 
media from disseminating trial information have been issued. 10 
In addition, trial judges have interdicted the media from dis-
seminating evidence given at hearings on pretrial motions. 11 
Trial participants and others have been forbidden from dis-
cussing lawsuits with the media or the public. 12 Judges have 
sealed records. 13 The media have been prohibited from pub-
lishing evidence received but not presented to the jury; judges 
have restricted publication to only that which occurred in the 
courtroom. 14 Judges have entered orders proscribing the 
media from making or publishing courtroom sketches, 15 or from 
mentioning a jury's verdict, 18 other indictments, 17 a settlement 
11 Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 339 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Til. App. Ct. 1975). 
11 Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1974) 
(Powell, Circuit Justice); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 P .2d 49, 52 (Hawaii 
1978); State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom. 
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 
N.E.2d 544, 546 (N.Y. 1977), affirmed,_ S. Ct._ (1979); Buffalo Courier-
Express, Inc. v. Stiller, 404 N.Y.S.2d 470,470-71 (App. Div. 1978); State ex rel. Dayton 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 1976). 
1z Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241 (1978) (per curiam); 
Central S.C. Ch., Soc'y of Prof. Journ. v. United States Dist. Ct., 551 F.2d 559, 561 
n.1 (4th Cir. 1977); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 
(includes relatives, close friends and associates); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. 
v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1997, 
1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
13 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241 (1978) (per curiam); 
WXYZ v. Hand, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1430, 1431 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Rosato v. Superior 
Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1975) (grand jury transcript), cert. denied, 
427 U.S. 912 (1976); Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978) (sentencing hearing transcript); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Ander-
son, 259 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Minn. 1977) (court retained complaint); Charlottesville 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Berry, 206 S.E.2d 267, 267-68 (Va. 1974) (all new cases filed). 
11 Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231-32 (Ct. App. 1973); State ex rel. 
Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1976); State ex rel. 
Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483, 483-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (per 
curiam); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377, 378 (N.J. 1977); New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 
380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1976); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 483 
P.2d 608, 609 (Wash.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1973). 
15 United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1"974). 
1
' Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Ark. 1972). 
17 United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 
(1974). 
1
" Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976). 
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agreement, 18 the name of a charged juvenile, 19 witnesses' names 
and photographs,20 or jurors' names.21 Finally, portions of the 
proceedings separate from the formal trial have been closed. 22 
The second observation concerns the impact of Nebraska 
Press on this area. Nebraska Press effectively forbids almost all 
judicial restrictions on disseminating material from public 
trials.23 That decision produced responses which are more plur-
alistic and ~ubstantively more difficult than the simple ap-
proach of protecting a fair trial with silence orders. Both major 
opinions in Nebraska Press contain dicta approving orders for-
bidding trial participants from discussing the prosecution with 
outsiders.24 Short of violating the sixth amendment right to a 
public trial, legislatures and appellate courts may permit or 
compel trial judges to close the courtroom for pretrial hearings 
and sensitive procedures such as juvenile hearings. Several dif-
ficult cases have arisen. In one, a state court decided to allow 
trial judges to close courtrooms when media coverage of sup-
pression hearings would threaten future jurors' impartiality.25 
The constitutionality of a state statute closing most juvenile 
records and hearings went unchallenged in one appeal.26 The 
effect of the first amendment on a criminal statute forbidding 
newspapers from publishing the names of those involved in 
juvenile proceedings is currently before the Supreme Court.27 
11 Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Okla. 1976), rev'd 
per curiam, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
20 Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877 (Ct. App. 1973). 
21 Central S.C. Ch., Soc'y of Prof. Joum. v. United States Dist. Ct. 551 F.2d 559, 
561 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977); Schuster v. Bowen, 496 F.2d 881, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1974); Des 
Moines Register Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 1976). 
22 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241 (1978) (per curiam); 
Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ark. 1977) (voir dire conducted 
in chambers); Keene Pub'g Corp. v. Keene District Court, 380 A.2d 261, 262 (N.H. 
1977) (probable cause hearing); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 127, 
129 (Ohio 1976); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 322 (Wyo. 1979) (bail hearing). 
23 See, e.g., Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
•~ 427 U.S. at 553-55 (Burger, C.J.) (majority opinion); id. at 602 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment). See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 
242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
23 Gannet Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1977), affirmed,_ S. Ct. 
_1979. 
2
' Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 310, 310 (1977) (per curiam). 
%1 State ex rel. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub'g Co., 248 S.E.2d 269 (W.Va.), affirmed, 
_ S. Ct. _1979. 
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The rules which govern access to juvenile proceedings, suppres-
sion hearings, preliminary hearings and arraignments, and bail 
hearings remain unclear.28 So long as this continues, trial 
courts will issue restrictive orders. 
I. JuRISDICTION: THE A!:JmTY TO IssUE RESTRICTIVE ORDERS 
Both subject matter jurisdiction (the power to resolve a 
particular type of dispute) and personal jurisdiction (the power 
to affect a particular person) are involved in unconventional 
ways in restrictive orders. 
The subject matter jurisdiction question is whether a trial 
judge presiding over a criminal prosecution possesses authority 
to issue restrictive orders aimed at circumscribing publicity. 
Courts find subject matter jurisdiction easier to assume than 
to examine.29 Courts with general constitutional and statutory 
jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal cases and .to grant injunc-
tions possess subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal 
action.3° Courts with limited criminal and no equitable juris-
diction, however, lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant re-
strictive orders so long as restrictive orders are characterized as 
injunctions.31 As a matter of policy, if the court possesses power 
to protect a criminal accused's right to an orderly and nonpre-
judicial trial, it should be able to regulate, in the furtherance 
of this goal, certain conduct outside the courtroom.32 
Accepting that the courts have the power to issue restric-
tive orders, the question becomes one of whom the court can 
make subject to the order. A recent student note incorrectly 
argues that restrictive orders against the media exceed the in-
herent power of the judiciary because the orders regulate the 
%ll Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 470-72 (1977). See also Williams v. Stafford, 589 
P.2d 322, 330 (Wyo. 1979) (Raper, C.J., dissenting). 
21 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-63 (1966); United States v. Schiavo, 
504 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); United States v. Dickinson, 
465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir.), on remand, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 476 
F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973); Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 
Cal. Rptr. 427, 437-38 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
"" Cf. Z. CHAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 364-74 (1950) (subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the Norris-LaGuardia Act). 
31 ld. at 312-13. 
32 See Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEx. L. REv. 
873, 903-905 (1975). 
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conduct of non parties. 33 Assuming that the media is a nonparty 
begs the personal jurisdiction question. Due process require-
ments of personal jurisdiction grow out of two policies: the 
sovereign must limit the exercise of its judicial authority to 
persons properly before it; and the initiating litigant must no-
tify affected people so that they can participate in the process. 
Service of process upon a defendant in the court's bailiwick 
satisfies both requirements. Referring to the hypothetical 
which· began this article, Mary Quill was not a party to the 
criminal prosecution, and thus arguably not properly before 
the court, and Judge Pinball did not serve formal notice on her 
or allow her an opportunity to participate in shaping the order. 
· Restrictive orders, with injunction-like features, arguably 
manage to avoid the above requirements. Equity often accomo-
dates traditional analysis of personal jurisdiction to ex parte 
and attenuated procedure by ignoring it; the court simply asks 
as part of the contempt inquiry whether a person must comply 
with an injunction.34 In Dickinson, the court had "no problem" 
with this type of personal jurisdiction: "the District Court cer-
tainly has power to . . . enforce those orders against all who 
have actual and admitted knowledge of its prohibitions."35 
Thus, the judge elevates the media to party status and subjects 
reporters to the risk of contempt simply by saying so. 
Generally, such broad theories of contempt have been re-
jected.36 One basis for rejection is that courts, in attempting to 
compel the world at large to obey their decrees, are exercising 
"sovereign powers to declare conduct illegal"-powers reserved 
to the legislature.37 Restrictive orders which judges announce 
33 Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the 
Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 342 (1977). 
31 See generally, Rendleman, supra note 32. 
35 465 F.2d at 511, 512. 
31 The Supreme Court has said that an injunction running against all persons with 
notice is "clearly erroneous" because it "assumes to make punishable as a contempt 
the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged 
according to law." Chase Nat'! Bank v. Norwark, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934) (footnote 
omitted). Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) rejects an expansive 
theory of obligation, stating that only "the parties to the action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, and attorneys, and . . . those persons in active concert or partici-
pation with them who receive actual notice" are obligated to obey. FED. R. Crv. P. 
65(d). 
31 Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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rather than formulate after adversary process and which com-
pel amorphous groups to comply assume the appearance of 
legislation. 
A second notion which leads to rejection of the Dickinson-
type contempt is that, generally, only parties and those ade-
quately represented by parties receive adequate notice to com-
ply with in personam orders. In the press of time, formal service 
is too cumbersome; in the analogous field of temporary re-
straining orders, telephone notice has been approved.38 Entities 
not notified and not in a sufficient relationship with one noti-
fied may ignore a restrictive order and defend contempt on the 
ground that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. 39 
Therefore, a restrictive order against "all members of the news 
media"40 violates ideas of both separation of powers and due 
process. 41 The procedure that a court accords a person affects 
whether the court secures jurisdiction over that person, and 
this article turns next to the question of trial court procedure. 
"" Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendments to Rule 65(b), 39 F.R.D. 122, 
124-25 (1966). 
~· Rendleman, supra note 32. The media is unnamed in a trial participant restric-
tive order but affected because the order affects its news gathering. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 
522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975). But see, Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
427, 438 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). The question of whether 
the media possesses standing to challenge such an order will be considered below. 
A participant in litigation may waive the right to challenge the court's jurisdiction 
over the person. See, e.g., Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Labs, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 
547 (3d Cir. 1967). The media in Nebraska Press responded to nonparty status by 
"intervening" in the criminal case. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that even 
though permission to intervene was erroneously granted, the media voluntarily as-
sented to in personam jurisdiction and was obligated to comply with the restrictive 
order. State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Neb. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub. 
nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See also, Oklahoma Pub'g 
Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Okla. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other 
grounds, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). Compare Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 
603, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) and People v. Green, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1561 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1978) (media allowed to intervene in a criminal case) with United States v. 
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (judge directed movants to turn request 
to intervene into a miscellaneous civil action), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Nixon 
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). Miami Herald and Green have 
almo~t the same practical effect as granting standing to contest a restrictive order. 
~~ See Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1289 n.1 (Okla. 1976), 
rev'd per curiam, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). . 
" Alemite Mfg. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930). See also State v. 
Simii;Jlts, 236 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Neb. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nebraska 
Pres~ Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Supreme Court reversed but apparently 
approved this concept. 427 U.S. at 565-66, 566 n.10. 
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fl. THE PROCEDURES FOR FORMULATION AND 
REVIEW OF RESTRICTIVE ORDERS 
[Vol. 67 
A. Trial Court Procedures 
Many judges, according the media the same procedural · 
protections Judge Pinball extended to Mary Quill, have simply 
announced the order sua sponte.42 In 1975, a federal court of 
appeals rejected the argument that the court should provide 
notice and an opportunity to be heard to the media before 
issuing a restrictive order because "we have been unable to find 
any authority to support it."43 This dismal state of affairs did 
not persist long. 
The need for participation by all affected is obvious. Deci-
sionmakers often fail to consider peoples' interests when those 
people are not heard. 44 Fair adjudication is more likely to occur 
when the tribunal hears all those affected. Facts are difficult 
to find and evaluate. Restrictive orders, like injunctions, turn 
on subtle and controversial considerations and upon a deli-
cate assessment of the particular situation in light of legal 
standards which are inescapably imprecise. In the absence of 
evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their 
participation in the formulation of value judgments, there is 
insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful 
conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amend-
ment adjudication.45 
Those who argue against formal restrictive order procedure 
assert that it will complicate and delay criminal trials. Indeed, 
the search for an adequate procedure was complicated by need 
for speed, the media's nonparty status, and complexity of the 
legal and factual inquiry which must consider measures short 
n See, e.g., United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1974); Central S.C. 
Ch., Soc'y Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1190-91 (D.S.C. 1977); New York 
Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1976). 
" CBS, Inc., v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975). See also STAFF OF 
SENATE SuacOMM. oN CoNST. RIGHTS, CoMM. oN THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CoNG., 2D SESs., 
BACKGROUND REPORT ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE EXPRESSION 62 (Comm. Print. 1976) 
(hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND REPORT]. 
~~ Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
45 Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) 
(footnote omitted). 
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of restrictive orders.46 However, the alternative to broadening 
procedure is to ignore the interests of the public and the media. 
Such an approach is intolerable. 
Procedures used in formulating restrictive orders have 
taken many forms. Some judges initiated informal procedures; 
one judge called reporters into chambers to discuss alterna-
tives. 47 Others followed more formal procedures, such as those 
used in equity to grant injunctions. 48 
In Nebraska Press, Justice Brennan observed that if the 
Constitution were construed to allow restrictive orders, courts 
would have to provide to the press notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. 49 The American Bar Association (ABA) in 1976 
recommended that before entering· an order enforceable by con-
tempt, the judge circulate the proposed order and give public 
notice, receive written comments, conduct a hearing, and draft 
specific findings and a detailed order. 5° Courts began to hold 
that notice, an opportunity to be heard, and written findings 
are constitutional prerequisites for restrictive orders.51 Judge 
Pinball's order to Mary Quill fails under these decisions. 
Nebraska Press also appeared to place the burden of justi-
fying a restrictive order on the proponent and to require the 
41 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976)(measures short of 
restrictive order discussed). 
47 State v. Joyce, 390 A.2d 151, 153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). 
~ Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 339 N.E.2d 477, 478-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975). 
~· Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 608 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
50 ABA REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
51 United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 8 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 
(1974); id. at 14-15 (Adams, C.J., concurring); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. 
v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1997, 
1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Des Moines Register and Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 
248 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Iowa 1976); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, 259 
N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1977); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544,550 (N.Y. 
1977), affirmed,_ S. Ct._ (1979); New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 
239, 244 (App. Div. 1976); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 
N.E.2d 127, 130-31 (Ohio 1976). See also STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CoNSTlTUTlONAL 
RiGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDlClARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON FREE PRESS-FAIR 
TRIAL 12 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. But see United 
States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977). [Ed. note: The Supreme Court 
majority opinion in Gannett, which spoke for only four Justices on this point and 
turned on the sixth amendment, held that the amendment guaranteed a 'tJublic trial 
to protect the party charged, not to protect the public, and assumed that the adverse 
parties would protect whatever public interest existed.] 
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judge to make specific findings.52 The ABA procedure falls 
short of this by permitting the judge to draft the order before 
allowing the media to participate. A judge could thus present 
the press with a fait accompli, hear opposition, and then issue 
the order originally proposed. The latter approach circumvents 
all the reasons for requiring formal procedure in the first place. 
Findings based on the evidence presented allow the adversary 
system to function, force the decisionmaker to consider care-
fully, and provide a basis for review of the order. The judge 
should approach the hearing with as open a mind as the cir-
cumstances permit and decide on the basis of evidence pre-
sented. In particular, the judge should be free of any vested 
interest in a specific order. 
Because of the pressure for expedition and the irregular 
party structure, restrictive order procedure is in a class by it-
self. Courts apply equity concepts such as the collateral bar 
rule and use injunction language. 53 The ABA recommendations 
paraphrase injunction procedure. 54 Restrictive order procedure 
often resembles that followed when a party applies for a pre-
liminary injunction. 55 Part of the reason for this resemblance 
is that the Supreme Court takes a broad view of orders subject 
to injunction procedure. 56 For example, as the Supreme Court 
hinted in Nebraska Press, the rules governing who is con-
strained to obey an injunction57 may determine who must com-
ply with a restrictive order.58 Courts considering restrictive or-
ders would do well to follow the general policies behind injunc-
52 427 U.S. at 569. See also State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Mcintosh, 
340 So. 2d 904, 912 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J ., concurring). Northwest Publications, Inc. 
v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 257-58 (Minn. 1977); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g 
Co. v. Kainrad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1976); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District 
Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Okla. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 
308 (1977); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 326 (Wyo. 1979). 
53 See, e.g., Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District' Court, 429 U.S. 967, 967, (1976) 
(granting stay). 
M Compare, Recommendation 6, ABA REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 6 at 10, with 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52 and 65(b). Compare Recommendation 6, ABA REcoMMENDATIONS, 
supra note 6 at 11, with F. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 
.. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRoCEDURE, § 2949 (1973) . 
.. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 177-80 (1973); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 
64, 75-76 (1967); Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-15 (1945). 
51 See Rendleman, supra note 32 . 
.,. 427 U.S. at 565-66. 
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tion procedure. These flexible procedures have been worked out 
over generations of experience to govern fluid situations.59 
An excellent technique for establishing a sound restrictive 
order procedure is for the state supreme court to use its rule-
making powers. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently pro-
mulgated a procedure for restricting access to records. 60 Under 
the Minnesota procedure, someone must move for an order 
sealing records. Notice is given to "interested persons, includ-
ing the news media." While the moving party carries the bur-
den of proof, others may present evidence and argument, and 
a court reporter keeps a record of the hearing. The judge must 
base findings on the evidence and reject alternatives. The rule 
specifically provides for a direct review by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court. 61 Procedure for orders to exclude the public from 
pretrial hearings is less protective, not specifying notice to the 
media and allowing the judge to close a hearing upon finding 
a "substantial likelihood that matter inadmissible at a later 
trial will, if disseminated, interfere with a potential jury's im-
partiality."62 If appellate courts had followed Minnesota's ex-
ample and used rulemaking powers to add constitutional re-
strictive order rules to procedural structures, a majority of the 
appellate opinions discussed and cited in this article would be 
unwritten, unnecessary, and perforce uncited. 
B. Attempts to Attack the "Indirect" Restrictive Order 
A problem arises concerning whether the media may assail 
orders which enjoin trial participants or close part of the pro-
ceedings. These orders affect the media's ability to gather news 
without being directly addressed to the media. Courts have 
discussed this problem in terms of standing, but standing 
launches an inquiry both too narrow and too unfocused to en-
compass an understanding of the interests affected. 
Since the order threatens the media's access to sources of 
•• It would be unwise to adopt completely injunction procedure. In United States 
v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 8 n.17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), the Court 
refused to do so. 
'" MtNN. R. CR!M. P. 25.03 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979). 
II Jd. at 25,03-5. 
12 !d. at 25.01. [Ed. note: The muddle created by the divided opinion in Gannett 
further emphasizes the need for comprehensive rules or statutes specifying procedure 
and defining standards.] 
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information, the focus should be on the strength of the rights 
affected,63 not on standing. Accordingly, one response in denial 
of media intervention is that since the media is left with the 
same right of access as everyone else, 64 the order impedes the 
media no more than any other member of the public. 
Such an approach ignores reality. A restrictive order af-
fects the media in a peculiarly draconian sense. Media repre-
sentatives may become parties and subject to contempt by 
having it said that they are parties. 65 If they ignore the order 
and are charged with contempt, the collateral bar rule may 
insulate the underlying order from scrutiny;66 this leaves only 
the questions of whether they knew of the order and whether 
they violated it. Thus the peculiarities of equitable procedure 
justify the ostensibly strained decision that even though the 
court may lack jurisdiction over media representatives, they 
possess standing to challenge restrictive orders directed toward 
trial participants. 
Courts which find standing hold that the restrictive order 
curtails the media's ability to gather news.67 Therefore, if it is 
necessary to discuss the issue in terms of standing, it should 
suffice to say that "the constitutional right here sought to be 
enforced is of such significance that any member of the public 
has a standing to question his exclusion from a judicial hear-
ing."68 That a media representative lacks "party" status to the 
13 Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421, 428 (1978) (discussion of standing in fourth 
amendment context). -
14 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (1978) (plurality opinion); Wil-
liams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 325 (1979). , 
'-' See Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 440 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. 
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
11 See discussion on the collateral bar rule contained in notes 116-49 infra and 
accompanying text. 
17 United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 968 (1978); Central S.C. Ch., Soc'y Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706, 707-08 
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 
237-38 (6th Cir. 1975); Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ark. 
1977); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 908 (Fla. 
1976); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Minn. 1977); 
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 130 (Ohio 1976). 
See also, STAFF REPORT, supra note 51, at 11-12. 
" Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 490 P.2d 563, 567 (Ariz. 1971). [Ed. 
note: In Gannett, four Justices asserted that the public, including the press, lacks an 
independently enforceable right to attend a criminal trial. Justice Powell, concurring, 
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criminal case or to the restrictive order should not change the 
result. 
Trial judges face pressure to avoid excessive publicity. 
While appellate courts reverse criminal convictions because of 
excessive publicity, no appellate court has reversed a convic-
tion because of excessive restrictions on the media. Trial dy-
namics lead judges to avoid potentially unfair publicity. Unless 
the media receives notice and a full opportunity to participate, 
trial judges may concentrate on the interest in fair trial and 
ignore "the largely theoretical and remote" benefits of free ex-
pression. 69 
The importance of the issues, the media's more than theo-
retical risk and, most of all, the assurance of full consideration 
of the merits before adjudication compel the conclusion that 
extending full procedural rights to all interested persons before 
considering any restrictive order is the best course to follow. In 
some cases, the courts have found for the media and refused 
to grant restrictive orders requested by parties.70 
C. Appellate Review 
The media's irregular party status and the need for an 
expeditious decision present special problems regarding appel-
late review of restrictive orders. Normally a losing party ap-
peals from the final judgment of a trial court. The appellate 
process lasts a little less than a year, from a leisurely 134-day 
briefing schedule in criminal appeals, to oral argument and a 
reasoned, written opinion. 71 But consider Mary Quill when 
Judge Pinball tells her not to publish a story. The trial will 
proceed. To consult a lawyer, she will have to leave the court-
house. An attorney will tell her that it may be difficult to do 
anything before the deadline for tomorrow's paper. 
Mary Quill has three options which she may use singly or 
combined. First, she may ask Judge Pinball to reconsider the 
and the four dissenting Justices found constitutionally-based rights to be heard and 
to be present generally.] 
" BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 62. 
70 State v. Joyce, 390 A.2d 151, 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); People v. 
Green, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1561, 1564 (N.Y. Super Ct. 1978). 
71 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. RoSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 14-15 (1976); 
Lay, Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expected Appeal, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
419, 419-20, 422 (1976). 
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order. 72 The court may deny formal intervention in the belief 
that an appearance by the media will add nothing to the more 
important issue of guilt or innocence except delay and com-
plexity.73 If, however, courts characterize the restrictive order 
as an injunction compelling the ;reporter to obey, she may file 
a motion asking Judge Pinball to clarify, modify, or dissolve 
the order. 74 
Second, Mary Quill may seek appellate review. In a federal 
system, she has roughly three appellate routes: an interlocutory 
appeal based on permission from both the trial judge and the 
appellate court;75 an appeal by right if the restrictive order is a 
final decision76 or a preliminary injunction;77 and review by 
extraordinary or prerogative writ which hinges on the appellate 
court exercising its discretion.78 Under any of the appellate 
routes suggested, an attorney will request a stay from both trial 
and appellate courts and seek an expedited appeal.79 
Mary Quill's third option is to publish her story. Outrage 
at the substantive and procedural aspects of the restrictive 
order as well as the lack of time to challenge it may prompt her 
to disseminate despite the order. If Judge Pinball decides to 
prosecute her for contempt, she will argue that the order vio-
lates the first amendment. · 
Whichever option is chosen, the motivation for each is the 
same. Restrictive orders begin to injure the marketplace of 
ideas immediately. The cliche, "justice delayed is justice de-
nied," is particularly appropriate. Today's hot news will be 
next week's cold history.80 This damage is particularly distaste-
ful in light of Nebraska Press' holding that many restrictive 
72 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
73 State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
" See Developments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1080-86 (1965). 
75 28 u.s.c. § 1292 (b) (1976). 
71 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1976). 
77 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) (1976). 
78 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1976); FED. R. APP. P. 2, 21. 
70 FED. R. C1v. P. 62; FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). See also, 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 55, at §§ 2904, 2908; 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. CooPER & E. GRESSMAN, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3954 (1977). 
'" State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (Fla. 
1976). 
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orders, including Judge Pinball's, are presumptively incorrect. 
Testing orders by disobeying them evidences disrespect for the 
trial judge, while writhing under the regimen of an erroneous 
order destroys the full exercise of constitutional rights. There-
fore, appellate courts should review restrictive orders 
promptly; and if the orders are incorrect, the court should sus-
pend their operation.81 
In an earlier article, the present author concluded dolo-
rously that the media lacked a realistic route to effective review 
of a restrictive order and that the proper appellate route was 
difficult or impossible to discern.82 Today courts have substan-
tially clarified the process. As devices to gain review of restric-
tive orders, the extraordinary writs (mandamus, prohibition 
and their functional equivalents) have triumphed.83 Adroit law-
yers couple requests for extraordinary writs with applications 
to both trial and appellate courts to dissolve, modify, and 
stay.8~ A few federal courts have classified restrictive orders as 
•• STAFF REPORT, supra note 51, at 11. 
•z Rendleman, supra note 4, at 128-44 ("There is no realistic route to relief in the 
appellate hierarchy."). 
113 United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1978); Central S.C. 
Ch., Soc'y Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706, 707 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1022 (1978); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 1975); Commercial 
Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Ark. 1977); State ex rei. Miami Herald 
Pub'g Co. v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 1976); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. 
Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 52-53 (Hawaii 1978) (prohibition); Des Moines Register and 
Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493,496 (Iowa 1976); Northwest Publications, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 255, 256-57 (Minn. 1977) (writ of prohibition); State 
v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), reu'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 
372 N.E.2d 544, 546, (N.Y. 1977), affirmed, _ S. Ct._ (1979) (proceeding "in' 
the nature of prohibition"); New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242-
43, (App. Div. 1976) (vacatur); State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 
N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 1976); State ex rei. Beacon Journal Pub'g Co. v. Kainrad, 348 
N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1976); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 
1288 (Okla. 1976), reu'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Charlottes-
ville Newspapers, Inc. v. Berry, 206 S.E.2d 267 (1974). See also, 16 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER, E. CoOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 79, at § 3933. 
•• Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978) (per curiam); 
Times-Picayune Pub'g Corp. v. Schulinkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1974) (Powell, 
Circuit Justice). Mr. Landau, representing the press, argues that restrictive orders 
should be automatically stayed. Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process 
Proposal-The Challenge of the Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 59 (1976). In 
practical terms, this means that no order would operate until an appellate court ap-
proved it. This rule would nearly destroy the criminal judge's ability to use restrictive 
orders. 
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appealable final decisions under the practical finality-
collateral order doctrine.85 Restrictive orders are final under the 
collateral order doctrine because they irreparably affect rights 
every day that pass without judicial protection.86 
Both methods are acceptable and each has its own advan-
tages. The collateral order doctrine has a benefit for the media: 
once the appellate court finds the order final, it has no discre-
tion to deny review. Extraordinary writ practice solves the 
problem presented by the media's lack of party status in the 
criminal action. An extraordinary writ is styled as a separate 
action in the appellate court filed by one aggrieved against the 
trial judge; such a procedure fits the conventional parties ma-
trix.87 Since most states have extraordinary writs, while the 
collateral order doctrine is a complex subspecies of federal 
practice, the procedure followed by a large majority of courts 
is to use the extraordinary writ to review restrictive orders. This 
article will hereinafter refer to review as being under an ex-
traordinary writ, although it can be as a collateral order where 
appropriate. 
The extraordinary writs, Chafee said in in 1950, "are rusty 
with antique learning and nicked with technicalities."88 Appel-
late courts possess power to interrupt trial court proceedings by 
accepting and deciding writs, but because of the policy to re-
view only after a final decision, they exercise their power spar-
ingly and rarely.89 Appellate courts should use the extraordi-
"' United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 968 (1978); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 4-5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1096 (1974). See also Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835,836 (M.D. Tenn. 
1965); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (N.J. 1977). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, 
& E. CoOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRoCEDURE, § 3911 at 489 (1976), and Supp. n.36 
(1979); BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 28-30. 
"' National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) 
(per curiam). Skokie was clearly predictable after Shuttleworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147, 159-64 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring), and Freedman v. Maryland, 
380 u.s. 51, 57-61 (1965). 
K7 See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1978); Gannett 
Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 57-58 (Hawaii 1978); State v. Simants, 236 
N.W.2d 794, 798 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See also 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER 
& E. GRESSMAN, supra note 79, at § 3932 (1977) (appellate courts dislike review appat:-
ently aimed at the trial judge personally). 
"" Z. CHAFEE, supra note 30, at 361. 
"' Suitors must show more than reversible error to summon review; the trial court 
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nary writs to review restrictive orders simply because the orders 
satisfy the criteria: they impinge on basic constitutional rights; 
a prompt, detached judgment is mandated because a person-
ally involved trial judge may have overlooked the media's in-
terest; and trial courts seek guidelines for future restrictive 
orders.90 
For the media, simply being permitted to raise the pro-
priety of a restrictive order is insufficient. Erroneous orders, so 
long as they are in effect, prevent the media from exercising 
first amendment rights. Time, a perishable commodity, cannot 
be recovered. The goal of the first amendment-keeping citi-
zens currently informed-is defeated. 91 Expedited review 
should lead to expedited relief. 
A stay ~an avoid the above problem. Trial and appellate 
courts use stays and appellate injunctions to suspend an order's 
operation pending an appellate decision. Generally a stay en-
sures an effective eventual judgment, preserves a controversy 
for the court to decide, and allows a plaintiff to profit from an 
appellate victory. However, in restrictive order cases a stay can 
result in a corresponding problem. If a stay suspends a trial 
court order and the enjoined events occur before an appellate 
decision, the decision to stay may decide the lawsuit without 
full appellate consideration. In the Pentagon Papers case, the 
Supreme Court "stayed" the newspapers from publishing the 
documents pending a final decision. This action permitted the 
Court to decide a live controversy. Continuing to "stay" publi-
cation pending a final decision was "final" for each day the 
interim order was effective. On the other hand, Justice Black 
wanted to vacate the order without oral argument.92 Allowing 
the newspapers to publish would have left nothing for the 
Court to forbid when it handed down its opinion. The govern-
must have abused discretion in an "extraordinary" fashion. See e.g., Thermatron 
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976). Several courts have used 
such narrow language when asked to grant extraordinary relief against a restrictive 
order. See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978); Honolulu 
Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 580 P.2d 58, 62 (Hawaii 1978); State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Pub'g Co. v. Kainrad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1976). 
10 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 137-38. 
11 State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (1977). 
See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 432 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (Blackmun, Circuit 
Judge); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976). 
12 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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ment's request to outlaw publication would have become moot. 
This raises the question of whether constitutional procedure 
must include access to prompt appellate consideration. 
A governing precedent is the per curiam opinion in 
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie. 93 An 
Illinois trial court enjoined theN .S.P. from. parading or demon-
strating; the state appellate courts refused to expedite the 
N.S.P.'s appeal or to stay the injunction. The Supreme Court 
held that the Illinois procedure constituted an improper proce-
dural restraint. To sort protectible expression from proscriba-
ble nonexpressive conduct, the state must "provide strict pro-
cedural safeguards" including either "immediate appellate 
review" or a stay.94 Subsumed but unstated in the opinion is 
the conclusion that the injunction was too broad to~be constitu-
tional. Skokie makes it clear that restrictive order procedure 
must include prompt review and a procedure either to reverse 
or to stay erroneous orders. 
Press representatives argue that trial courts' restrictive 
orders should be automatically stayed pending an appellate 
decision. 95 In almost every instance, an automatic stay would 
let the media disseminate the material the trial judge sought 
to restrict and thereby present the appellate court with a moot 
appeal. This procedural rule is at odds with a substantive stan-
dard which approves some restrictive orders.96 The ABA com-
mittee correctly rejected the automatic stay and recommended 
"expedited judicial review of any restrictive orders before the 
issues addressed become moot.''97 To determine whether the 
committee states an aspiration rather than a practical policy, 
we must look at the actual results in decided appeals. 
The means for speedy review of restrictive orders are stays 
and extraordinary writs. The published appellate reports illus-
trate disparate approaches to these means. Many appellate 
courts have reviewed restrictive orders and rendered effective 
decisions within one or a few days after the trial judges had 
13 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). 
11 ld. at 44. 
15 Landau, supra note 84, at 59-60. 
" Note, Ungagging the Press: Expedited Relief from Prior Restraints on News 
Coverage of Criminal Proceedings, 65 GEo. L. J. 81, 113-14 (1976). 
17 Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60, 63 (1976). 
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entered the orders or they had received the appellate docu-
ments.vs Other appellate courts, however, have taken weeks.99 
The conclusion must be a mixed one: appellate courts can act 
almost instantaneously, but some lack the will to do so. When 
an appellate court demurs, a trial judge can enter an erroneous 
order, even one which frustrates the clear rules allowing the 
media to report on proceedings held in open court, 100 and do the 
harm before an appellate court can reverse. 
On the other hand, instantaneous appellate action cuts 
against the American grain; it gives the appearance of a "shoot 
now, look later" decision. The judicial process, especially at the 
appellate level, prides itself on articulated reasoned results. 
The tradition includes full briefing, 'informed judges, a collegial 
decision, a circulated opinion, and announced reasons. 101 Bri-
tish appeals contrast sharply. Immediately after oral argu-
ment, British judges announce their decision from the bench. 
If policies interfere with our goal of swift decisions, perhaps 
American courts can adopt some of the British experience for 
use in restrictive order appeals. 
These observations are inherent in the functions of appel-
late courts: 1) to announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of 
decision; and 2) to review particular trial court decisions for 
correctness. The first function provides published opinions to 
guide attorneys and trial judges in the future; the second rein-
•• See WXYZ v. Hand, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1430, 1431 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (temporary 
restraining order granted the day complaint filed); State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 
1997, 1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (2·3 days from petition to decision); Des Moines 
Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1976) (next day); 
Times-Picayune Pub'g Corp. v. Marullo, 334 So. 2d 426, 426 (La. 1976) (same day); 
Keene Pub'g Corp. v. Keene District Court, 380 A.2d 261, 262 (N.H. 1977) (next day); 
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 144 (Ohio 1976) 
(Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (8 days). See also Note, supra note 96, at 118 (5 days). 
" See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 242 (1978) (per 
curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (two weeks to Pennsylvania Supreme Court); 
Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 429 U.S. 967, 967 (1976) (5 weeks to the United 
States Supreme Court); Gannett Pacific Co. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 52 (Hawaii 
1979) (2 weeks to Supreme Court of Hawaii); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 324 
(Wyo. 1979) (22.5 weeks to Supreme Court of Wyoming); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. 
District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1284 (Okla.), rev'd per curiam, 439 U.S. 308 (1977) (10 
weeks to Oklahoma Supreme Court); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g Co. v. Kain-
rad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 695 (Ohio 1976) (17 weeks to Ohio Supreme Court); New York 
Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (N.Y. 1976) (2 weeks). 
1
" Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 556-57 (1977). 
111 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADoR, M. RosENBERG, supra notif71, at 31. 
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forces trial courts' authority or obviates the effect of error. 
Courts generally combine these functions without excessive 
tension. In restrictive order cases, however, the appellate court 
may find that it cannot articulate a reasoned opinion promptly 
enough to avoid the effect of a trial court's error. When review-
ing a restrictive order, if the appellate court acts fast enough 
to avoid perpetuating error, then deciding particular lawsuits 
may dominate over considerations of creating precedent. 
Perhaps it is not necessary to choose between prompt re-
view and reasoned opinion. When trial courts need future guid-
ance, much may be said for the way the Iowa Supreme Court 
disposed of Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. 
Osmundson. 102 The trial judge restrained dissemination of in-
formation about jurors, but the next day the Iowa Supreme 
Court prevented the trial judge from enforcing that order. It 
reserved jurisdiction to write an opinion following submission 
of briefs. Several months later, the supreme court issued a full 
dress opinion.103 While the approach was one of "shoot now, 
look later," this was preferable to one of "shoot now, never 
look." The risk of such a procedure is that a later opinion will 
not conform with a previously announced decision. It has been 
noted that "conclusions easily reached without setting down 
the reasons sometimes undergo revision when the decider sets 
out to justify the decision."104 Because restrictive orders place 
an extraordinary strain on procedure, we commit this risk to 
the professionalism of appellate judges and to the possible use-
fulness of short, unsigned per curiam opinions. 
A less attractive alternative to reviewing restrictive orders 
also exists. The flexibility of the mootness doctrine lets an 
appellate court indulge in the reverse of the foregoing-it can 
write opinions without deciding lawsuits. Part of the doctrine's 
flexibility grows out of the tension between appellate courts' 
deciding and announcing functions. If an appellate court exists 
to ensure correct decisions in individual lawsuits, then, at the 
earliest possible moment, that court should stay and decide 
any restrictive order which ostensibly infringes the media's 
102 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976). 
103 See also, Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 216 (1952); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154 
(1952) (per curiam); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978). 
1~ P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. RosENBERG, supra note 71, at 31. 
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rights. Under this approach, the only restrictive order appeals 
which become moot are those the parties fail to bring to the 
court in time to correct. 105 On the other hand, if a court's princi-
pal role is to develop, articulate, and announce a body of pre-
cedent, then the timing of review is not critical. The court, to 
guide lower courts and attorneys, may publish opinions which 
do not affect actual controversies. 106 Mootness deCisions mirror 
this conflict: "the cases applying [the general mootness rules] 
are not entirely consistent with each other."107 
Proceeding with the criminal trial generally moots appel-
late review of restrictive orders before the parties complete the 
usual appellate schedule. 108 In order to satisfy the function of 
establishing reasoned precedent, the rules of mootness have 
been modified arguably to include restrictive orders: society 
requires a precedent to guide the resolution of individual issues 
which avoid review, yet are likely to recur. 109 Many appellate 
courts accordingly follow Nebraska Press and hold that restric-
tive order appeals are not "moot" if the problem is likely to 
occur again. 110 
While few quarrel with the goal of developing the body of 
precedent, it is possible to criticize appellate courts which file 
restrictive order opinions after the events which gave rise to the 
appeal have passed. Declining to decide the concrete issue with 
a stay or extraordinary writ while the issues are still alive only 
to turn in a ringing opinion later111 may, in particular, be ques-
105 See, e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977) (per curiam). 
101 See Note, supra note 96, at 101-02. 
117 J. NowAK, R. RoTuNDA, J. YoUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 60 (1978). Cf. Williams 
v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 1979) (court denied relief to petitioners, but 
established standards for future similar cases). 
1
" State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1997, 1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
101 See Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). 
111 United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Commercial Print-
ing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271-72 (Ark. 1977); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g 
Co. v. Mcintosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 1976); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254,256-57 (Minn. 1977); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377,380 (N.J. 
1977); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547 (N.Y. App. 1977), affirmed, 
99 S. Ct. (1979); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g Co. v. Kainrad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 
696 (Ohio 1976). But see Schuster v. Bowen, 496 F.2d 881, 881 (9th Cir. 1974). 
111 See e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976); Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1027 (1975). 
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tioned. Vindicating the abstract principle after refusing to de-
cide the concrete controversy extends a hollow victory to the 
winner, supplies scant incentive to correct later erroneous or-
ders, and confirms the gibe that courts display one set of fust 
amendment values and apply another. Vigorous opinions after 
restrictive orders expire offer only specious and abstract safe-
guards to people who groaned under illegal orders while waiting 
for a belated decision. 112 Giving the media "the choice of obey-
ing an order and awaiting appellate action while their alleged 
civil rights continue to be infringed, or of disobeying the order 
and then facing certain contempt convictions, makes any sub-
sequent victory on appeal Pyrrhic indeed."113 The practice of 
reviewing restrictive orders after they expire provides an argu-
ment against the collateral bar rule, just as. the collateral bar 
rule provides an argument for a prompt appellate decision. 114 
Courts should act promptly to obviate trial court error and 
review restrictive orders rapidly to shorten the sway of uncon-
stitutional but unchallengable orders.115 
ill. CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF RESTRICTIVE ORDERS 
A. The Collateral Bar Rule 
It is entirely possible that a court will enforce a restrictive 
order without considering its validity. The Dickinson court 
approved the use of contempt despite the finding that the order 
was unconstitutional. The doctrine which allows a judge to 
impose criminal contempt sanctions on a defendant who has 
violated a substantively invalid injunction is known as the col-
lateral bar rule. It holds that the contempt proceeding is collat-
eral to the breached order and rejects as a defense to contempt 
the argument that the order is wrong. Contemnors may defend 
criminal contempt only by arguing that the order is void be-
c.cause the court lacked personal or slibject matter jurisdic-
112 See e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs o~ Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 
(1968) (Supreme Court's 1968 decision reversing an order that expired in August of 
1966). ; 
113 United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 
(1974). I 
m ld. at 11 (Adams, C.J., concurring). 
115 See, e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977). 
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tion. 116 Sound policy supports the colla,teral bar rule: people 
must settle disputes in an orderly fashion and show respect for 
the court system. 
Critics attack use of the collateral bar rule in restrictive 
order contempts. First, the procedure that trial judges follow 
in deciding whether to adopt an order and how to formulate it 
is often hasty; judges have issued restrictive orders without 
considering fully the media's interests.117 "[T]he order is argu-
ably non-injunctive and issued by a criminal rather than a civil 
court, without the usual protections of adversary adjudication, 
purporting to bind, upon mere knowledge, persons not parties 
to the underlying action." 118 The media is often forced into the 
position of violating the order because it cannot mount and 
complete effective review in time to meet reporting dead-
lines.119 Violation is its only alternative. "The collateral bar 
rule places the entire burden of the judicial time delay problem 
on the party whose perishable rights are at stake."12° Further-
more, the "rights at stake" are constitutional rights. "The in-
terest of the public and litigants will not allow an individual 
to be deprived of such rights simply because a court, at an 
earlier time, made an incorrect ruling."121 Imposing contempt 
for violating an unconstitutional order punishes a citizen for 
doing something which the basic law approves. Even if the 
order is correct, contempt under the collateral bar rule decides 
without examining the merits of the order, thereby creating the 
appearance that the judge has converted respect into revenge. 
Merit avoidance techniques are not favored devices in an open 
and democratic society. 
Nebraska Press strengthens the conclusion that many re-
111 United States v. Dickinson, 465 F .. 2d 496, 511 (5th Cir.), on remand, 349 F. 
Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 
(1973). . 
117 Landau, supra note 84, at 58; Rendleman, supra note 4, at 150-53. 
110 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 152. 
111 See Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litiga-
tion of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 497, 505 (1977); Note, 
supra note 96, at 90, 121. 
128 Note, Gag Orders on the Press: A Due Process Defense to Contempt Citations, 
4 HAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 187, 203 (1977). 
121 Vestal, Law of the Case: Single Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 1, 29. But 
see United States v. Dickinson, 476 F.2d 373, 374 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
414 u.s. 979 (1973). 
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strictive orders are wildly unconstitutional. Accordingly, an 
exception to the collateral bar rule has developed. In Walker 
v. Birmingham, the Supreme Court approved Alabama's col-
lateral bar rule but hinted that the rule would not apply when 
the violated order is "transparently invalid."122 Some writers 
argue that restrictive orders against disseminating material 
from open court proceedings are "transparently invalid" and 
within the Walker exception. 123 Under these critiques, the 
media could disseminate in the face of a severely deficient 
restrictive order and take its chance in contempt. If the order 
was wrong, no contempt would result; if the order was correct 
or only marginally wrong, the court could impose contempt.124 
For example, Nebraska Press and the Walker exception would 
allow Mary Quill to publish despite Judge Pinball's order. 
Judicial techniques to avoid wielding the collateral bar 
rule are available. As the final curtain rang down on the con-
tempt litigation concerning Ross Barnett's attempts to prevent 
James Meredith from desegregating Ole' Miss, Judge Wisdom 
observed wryly but perceptively: "There is no doubt that a 
contempt proceeding has play in the joints."125 More specifi-
cally, judges feel free at any point in a contempt proceeding to 
exercise discretion on behalf of people charged with contempt. 
Courts have used this discretion to ameliorate the rigorous ap-
plication of the collateral bar rule, often without much concern 
for doctrinal consistency. 
Such leniency is often presented in restrictive order con-
tempt cases. 126 On occasion the courts have struck down uncon-
stitutional orders without mentioning the possibility of a con-
tempt proceeding.127 An Illinois court ignored apparently bind-
ing precedent, stated that it was "not persuaded" by 
122 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967). 
123 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 100, at 555-58; Goodale, supra note 119, at 509. 
See also Rendleman, supra note 4, at 161-62. 
121 Goodale, supra note 119, at 509; Rendleman, supra note 4, at 159-61; Note, 
supra note 96, at 111; Note, supra note 120 at 217-18. 
120 United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 107 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, C.J., 
dissenting). 
121 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 153-54 (collection of earlier cases). 
177 See, e.g., Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); United 
States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) Times-
Picayune Pub'g Corp. v. Marullo, 334 So. 2d 426 (La. 1976); New York Times Co. v. 
Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. 1976). 
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Dickinson, and held that illegal restraints on communication 
are outside the collateral bar rule.128 The Senate Staff Report 
on free press and fair trial advocates avoiding the collateral bar 
rule by staying any contempt hearing or punishment until re-
view of the underlying order is completed.129 
Aside from Dickinson, reported decisions favor the lenient 
approach. Research reveals no other reported decision impos-
ing contempt on a media representative for disseminating ma-
terial about the judicial process despite an unconstitutional 
restrictive order. 130 This result is sound. Courts should refuse to 
place anyone in the dilemma of choosing between silence in the 
face of an unconstitutional order or punishment for exercising 
a constitutional right. In restrictive order contempts, the col-
lateral bar rule undermines the first amendment.131 Open and 
vigorous debate on public issues cannot flourish when judges 
punish people who disseminate constitutionally protected ex-
pression. 
While the foregoing militates against the collateral bar 
rule in restrictive order contempts, recent procedural develop-
ments may be adduced as reasons that courts might use it. 
Lack of notice, party status, a hearing, and an appeal are the 
best arguments against applying the rule to contemnors 
charged with breaching restrictive orders. As noted earlier, 
however, courts are developing proced1,ual structures to issue 
and review restrictive orders.132 Notice that an order may be 
granted permits the media an opportunity to show that a re-
strictive order is unnecessary, forces the judge to consider alter-
natives, and allows the media to assist in shaping any order 
IZII Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 365 N.E.2d 746, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
The binding precedent is UMW of America Hospital v. UMW Dist. 50, 288 N .E.2d 455, 
457 (lll. 1972). 
121 STAFF REPORT, supra note 51, at 12. 
1
"" Note, supra note 120 at 195-96. 
131 BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 78. 
1n Some argue that promulgating restrictive order procedure will encourage judges 
to issue orders they otherwise would refuse to consider, Note, supra note 96, at 85; that 
such a result will delay and detain the criminal trial, Roney, supra note 97, at 61-62; 
and that it will baptize substantially incorrect orders, see THE REPORTER's COMMITTEE 
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PREss, PREss CENSORSHIP NEWSLE'ITER No. X at 35 (Sept.-Oct. 
1976). These assumptions are incorrect for two reasons. First, they assume that the 
procedure will not work. Second, they assume that almost all restrictive orders are 
substantively invalid. While this may be true of trial orders, it is not true of sealing 
and closing orders. 
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before the court grants it. Prompt appellate review provides an 
opportunity to correct erroneous restrictive orders. The more 
procedure available, the more a restrictive order looks like an 
injunction, and the more legitimate it becomes to apply the 
collateral bar rule.133 
The argument for applying the collateral bar rule to viola-
tions of restrictive orders preceded by notice and an opportun-
ity to be heard is strong. The media should respect the court 
and test the order in a legal fashion. In particular, the media 
should not appoint itself judge in its own case and flout the 
order, potentially endangering the trial process, impairing the 
defendant's rights, and creating public disrespect for the court 
system. Good citizens obey judicial orders until they are dis-
solved, modified, or reversed on appeal. Therefore, as part of 
the procedure which leads to justifiable use of the collateral bar 
rule, access to review is essential. 
In National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, the Su-
preme Court held that a procedure to enjoin a parade or dem-
onstration must include either immediate appellate review or 
a stay. 134 That conclusion is more clearly compelled in dealing 
with restrictive orders. Because of the odd party structure in 
restrictive orders, the sensitive rights at issue, and the propen-
sity of trial judges to ignore the media's interests, this author 
concludes that, after Skokie, even if notice and an opportunity 
to be heard precede a restrictive order, the media is entitled to 
a review of the order on the merits before a court may impose 
the collateral bar rule in contempt.135 
Despite cogent criticism of the present author's position 
that judges should not issue injunctions absent advance notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, 136 this writer continues to be-
lieve that unless the media receives notice and an opportunity 
to be heard, it should be able to ignore a restrictive order with 
impunity .137 If notice and a hearing precede a restrictive order, 
133 Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 Iu.. L. F. 221, 
248; Rendleman, More on Void Orders, 47 GA. L. REv. 246, 282-85 (1973). 
"' 432 U.S. at 44. 
133 Note, supra note-96, at 116. 
131 Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L.J. 531, 582-
89 (1975); Rendleman, More on Void Orders, supra note 133, at 291-309; Rendleman, 
Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 133, at 241-53. 
137 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 151-52. But see Note, supra note 120, at 216 n.137. 
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should the collateral bar rule insulate the order from scrutiny 
in the contempt trial of a violator? Yes, if the contemnor had 
reasonable access to review and time to seek it. In Walker, the 
Court affirmed contempt without considering whether the 
order was constitutional; one reason, the Court stated, was that 
the contemnors could hav:) sought review but failed to do so. 
If, the Court hinted, the defendants had moved to dissolve the 
injunction or attempted to appeal it but had "met with delay 
or frustration," then they could have violated the order and its 
validity would have been an appropriate issue in contempt.138 
At this juncture, it is beneficial tv apply the above s ~ges­
tions to the hypothetical involving Mary Quill. Assume Judge 
Pinball mails notice to the Trumpet and holds a hearing two 
weeks before the trial. Mter hearing evidence and argument, 
the judge forbids the paper to publish jurors~ names. The 
Trumpet does nothing during the fortnight even though the 
nearby state appellate court vacated an earlier restrictive order 
the day after the judge granted it. Mter the jury is sworn, the 
Trumpet publishes the jurors' names and pictures. If the issues 
are ventilated in an early adversary hearing, the judge may 
impose the collateral bar rule. Judge Pinball could properly 
charge contempt and interpose the collateral bar rule to pre-
vent the Trumpet from ,arguing that the order was wrong.139 
If Judge Pinball issues the order the day before trial, a 
more pragmatic inquiry must be followed. First, contempt's 
"play in the joints" might instruct a court to be lenient and 
reject the collateral bar rule. If the court concludes that the 
order is invalid, it should consider, despite the collateral bar 
rule, "whether the judgment of contempt or the punishment 
therefor would still be deemed appropriate in light of the fact 
that the order disobeyed was constitutionally infirm."140 Sec-
ond, whether either the parties or the trial judge delayed the 
restrictive order hearing until the last moment should bear on 
1
"' Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318 (1967). See also United States 
v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 n.4 (1971). 
131 Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 133, at 
248. 
111 United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 514 (5th Cir.), remand, 349 F. Supp. 
227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). 
Neither the district court on remand, the second appellate panel, nor the Supreme 
Court took this salutary hint. 
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the decision to suspend or apply the collateral bar rule. Delay 
until just before the restricted event, followed by unseemly 
haste to enter an order, militates against its application. 
Moreover, if the event follows hard upon the heels of the 
restrictive order hearing, the judge should delay the event to 
allow the affected media to seek an extraordinary writ or a 
stay .141 If the media fails to seek appellate relief before breach-
ing, it has passed up an opportunity to challenge the order in 
a timely fashion; the judge then may intercalate the collateral 
bar in good conscience. If the media seeks review, but meets 
"delay or frustration," the media should violate the order and 
take its chances that the order is wrong. 
What is delay or frustration? The media should extend the 
appellate court a meaningful opportunity to consider and eval-
uate the merits. It should not simply file appellate papers and 
then disobey the order if no. relief is forthcoming by "press 
time." 142 Many appellate courts review restrictive orders within 
hours, if not days. But generalization is perilous. Newspapers 
in cities like New Orleans and New York with both trial and 
appellate courts nearby may expect same-day service. Jones-
ville, in the southwest corner of Virginia where the trial courts 
of Lee County sit, is closer to eight state capitols, including 
Columbus, Ohio, than it is to Richmond. American appellate 
judges are probably not ready for telephoned oral arguments. 143 
Finally, if an appellate court refuses to stay a restrictive order 
before the event without giving an opinion on the merits of the 
order, then on a contempt appeal after violation that court 
should consider whether the collateral bar rule serves any use-
ful purpose. 144 These generalizations are not easy to f;lpply, but 
they focus judgment on the critical issues in deciding whether 
to apply the collateral bar rule to restrictive order contempts. 
w Note, supra note 96, at 114. 
uz Contra, Goodale, supra note 119, at 511. 
•u But cf. Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, F. R. CIV. P. 30(b), (Feb. 1979) (permits telephone deposi-
tions). 
1
" See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432_ U.S. 43, 44 
(1977) (per curiam). 
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B. Substantive Doctrine 
Appellate review cannot always offset the harm produced 
by erroneous restrictive orders. Impecunious businesses may 
accede to orders to save the expense of an appeal. The delay 
inherent in the appellate process will impede some dissemina-
tion even for the affluent. Even workable review cannot substi-
tute for clear substantive standards which trial courts can 
apply easily and correctly. The necessity for clear standards is 
especially important when one realizes that restrictive orders 
are ancillary to criminal prosecutions and are often entered 
without extended consideration. Trial judges ought to be able 
to discern quickly and easily, without extensive deliberation 
and research, what will do and what will not. 
The guidance given in reviewing restrictive orders is 
founded in prior restraint analysis. The use of prior restraint 
doctrine in analyzing restrictive orders presents several basic 
difficulties. First, courts use the words "prior restraint" to deal 
with two discrete problems: procedural restraints and 
substantive-remedial restraints. Procedural restraints are rules 
to govern the process the government may use to sort out pro-
tected expression from the unprotected; for example, the 
merely sexually explicit from obscenity. Because the govern-
ment legitimately regulates conduct on the borderland of ex-
pression, courts require careful processes or procedural re-
straints. 145 This article has considered the procedural restraint 
problem in its discussion of restriCtive orders arid notice, a 
hearing, and findings. 
Without articulating the basic distinction, courts also use 
the words "prior restraint" to characterize the question of 
whether a particular rule of conduct unconstitutionally pro-
scribes protected expression. However, the two separate 
spheres of prior restraint merit different analytical tools.146 
Using the same standards for both substantive and procedural 
analysis diffuses thought. Restrictive order procedure is infor-
mal, juryless, and may include a collateral bar; but character-
us L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, §§ 12-31 (1978); Rendleman, 
Civilizing Pornography: The Case for an Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 509, 533-35 (1977); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unrav-
eling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 688 (1978). 
111 Rendleman, supra note 145, at 534. 
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izing restrictive orders as prior restraints adds nothing but con-
fusion to the different questions of whether the procedure is 
constitutional and whether the order interdicts protected ex-
pression. 
A second problem presented in using prior restraint analy-
sis is the disparate treatment afforded "prior restraints" and 
identical criminal or civil sanctions. Courts discussing prior 
restraints generally state or assume that a prior restraint is 
noncriminal in nature and that it differs from criminal punish-
ment subsequent to the proscribed activity. 147 Courts say that 
restrictive order prior restraints operate with rigor: "a threat of 
criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, 
prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."148 But a restric-
tive order does not necessarily freeze speech; it stops speech 
like a stop sign stops an automobile driver. The order, like a 
statute, establishes the standard; the conduct follows; and if 
the court decides that the conduCt violates the standard, the 
state punishes the actor. If someone commences contempt pro-
ceedings charging violation of a restrictive order, then con-
tempt is analogous to a criminal prosecution or to a civil action. 
Punishment for contempt is no more or less subsequent than 
punishment for breaching a criminal statute. The sanction 
imposed after finding contempt resembles both criminal pun-
ishment and civil money judgments.149 
Courts compound the confusion by disapproving a prior 
restraint while saying that they would approve an identical 
criminal or civil rule. 150 If the conduct proscribed by a prior 
restraint is unpunishable as either a crime or a tort, the court 
should be able to invalidate the restraint under substantive 
doctrine applicable to all three remedial systems. An example 
is provided by Nebraska Press. The Supreme Court used prior 
m. See, e.g., Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 
498 (Iowa 1976). 
u• Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
tu See, f?.g., In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (per curiam) (civil 
contempt in same case); Hadnott v. Amos, 325 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (per 
curiam) (civil contempt); United States v. Brotherhood ofR.R. Trainmen, 95 F. Supp. 
1019 (D.D.C. 1951). 0. Flss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 69-70 (1978); Barnett, The 
Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 550-51 (1977) . 
... Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 u.s. 697, 711, 715 (1931). 
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restraint doctrine against an order invalid as either a tort stan-
dard or a criminal statute. Since the first amendment forbids 
government sanctions against people who disseminate informa-
tion revealed in open court, the Supreme Court unnecessarily 
applied prior restraint analysis. 151 Prior restraint doctrine 
merely provides a subterfuge to decide in favor of particular 
speech without adjudicating whether parallel criminal or civil 
law is valid. 
The third major flaw in using prior restraint analysis in 
restrictive order cases is the substantial obscurity created 
about what kind of things are invalid. For example, Near v. 
Minnesota152 decided that, in addition to executive licensing, 
injunctions could be prior restraints. However, Near is ambigu-
ous because it fails to clarify whether the Minnesota statute 
was unconstitutional because it permitted an injunction for-
bidding any publication by the newspaper or because it allowed 
an injunction which let the newspaper publish again but cre-
ated potential judicial censorship.153 
More recent decisions add to the obscurity. Of particular 
importance is Nebraska Press. Justice Brennan, in Nebraska 
Press, favors clear rules against restrictive orders; he would 
achieve this by holding that the only acceptable prior restraints 
are those which forbid dissemination of national security infor-
mation in time of war. 154 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, on the 
other hand, allows some restrictive orders, 155 but applies "the 
nadir of first amendment protection" to judge "the legality of 
prior restraints. " 156 
Mter holding that an order forbidding the media from dis-
seminating material is an invalid prior restraint, the majority 
opinion says in dicta that a similar order against trial partici-
pants is a measure short of a prior restraint. 157 This idea points 
1s1 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 568 (1976); id. at 596 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Barnett, supra note 100, at 545-46, 550; Sack, Principle and 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 411, 414-15 (1977). 
IS2 283 u.s. 697 (1931). . 
1u See id. at 705-06, 709-13; id. at 736 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
1u 427 U.S. at 588, 592-93 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
155 Id. at 570. 
1sa Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 431 (1977). 
ssr Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (dicta). 
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out a key problem in using prior restraint analysis. A restrictive 
order by any other name silences as effectively; and the defen-
dant's attorney may feel just as restrained as the media.158 Prior 
restraint doctrine allows courts to manipulate results by affix-
ing labels. 
Similarly, one court said that denying access to material 
is not a prior restraint but an order short of prior restraint. 159 
Other courts have held that orders closing a courtroom or seal-
ing a transcript are not prior restraints.160 Nonetheless, these 
orders, if effective, curtail expression; a sealing or closing order 
is "the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on speech or 
publication. " 161 
The resulting doctrine is that the government can keep 
secrets by locking the barn door, but once the horse escapes 
from the barn the newspaper may publish stories about it.162 
Apparently the right to disseminate material is broader than 
the right to have it disclosed; and a newspaper may publish 
things about which it had no right to learn. Such a result places 
prior restraint analysis in a vacuum; instead of factually and 
systematically analyzing the entire problem of publicity in the 
judicial process with uniform ~tandards, courts subscribing to 
prior restraint will deal with trial participants and closing and 
sealing orders under one theory and with trial silence orders 
under prior restraint. If the government can seal and close, 
denying access to everybody equally, prior restraint doctrine 
"" Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defen-
dants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidenci v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REv. 607 
(1977); BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 18-24, 46, 68-71. 
1
" United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977). 
110 Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. App. 1978). See 
also, Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 324 (Wyo. 1979). [Ed. note: In Gannett, the 
majority distinguishes the direct prior restraint of Nebraska Press from the present 
"exclusion" order. 99 S. Ct._,_ n.25 (1979).] 
1
'
1 Note, The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions in a Continuing 
Struggle, 6 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1013, 1031 (1978). 
182 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); id., 
at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 
310-12 (1977) (per curiam); Cox Pub'g Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975); United 
States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 n.15 (5th Cir.); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 
N.E.2d 544, 549-50 (N.Y. 1977), affirmed 99 S. Ct._ (1979). Cf. In re Halkin, 4 
Med. L. Rptr. 2025, 2032-35 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (relationship between access under com-
pulsory process and the right to disseminate). See also, Annot., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 871 
(1978); Standard 8-3.1, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 13-14. 
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may not help much except for "public" trials. Thus, obscure 
prior restraint doctrine detracts from the simple idea that in a 
democracy, the public is entitled to observe how the system of 
justice is treating people unless compelling reasons for secrecy 
exist.163 
Nebraska Press may even be ineffective in suppressing 
orders not to disseminate materials from an open trial. The 
Supreme Court states the effect of a prior restraint opaquely: 
we assume that the nature of the restriction compels additional 
safeguards but allows prior restraints when the government 
leaps the hurdle of justification.164 While striking down the 
order in Nebraska Press, the majority opinion explicitly as-
sumed that it might approve a similar, more justified, order 
another day. 165 Restrictive orders barring dissemination of in-
formation from an open judicial proceeding may occur again. 166 
Prior restraint doctrine hampers intelligent analysis of re-
strictive order issues. The courts have said something like, "We 
1
"' "A popular Government without popular information or the means of acquiring 
it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm them-
selves with the power knowledge gives." WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hurst ed. 
1910). 
111 Nebraska Press Aes'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1976) . 
... ld. The majority opinion, however, lacks solidarity. Two of the five Justices 
who concurred in the opinion state different and somewhat less restrictive views. !d. 
at 570-71 (White, J., concurring); id. at 571-52 (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, the 
Chief Justice's opinion may not even speak for a majority of the Court. See 0. Ftss, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 103 n.2 (1978); BACKGROUND REPoRT, supra note 43, at 
84. 
The Bar Association's standards appear to reflect this ambiguity. The 1976 proce-
dural standards expressed no opinion on substantive law. Roney, supra note 97, at 71. 
Justice Brennan's opinion, which expressed the views of three of the Justices, 
would have held that the government could not prohibit dissemination of "any infor-
mation pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or the operation of the criminal 
justice system no matter how shabby the means by which the information is obtained." 
427 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). Unlike Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens was 
unwilling to allow a reporter who steals information to escape contempt; however, he 
did accept the balance of Justice Brennan's views. !d. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
The Bar Association's 1978 Standards 8-4.2, which exonerates reporters from contempt 
unless they are guilty of "bribery, theft, or fraud" in acquiring the information, ap-
pears to adopt Justice Stevens' views instead of the putative majority's. 
111 Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REv. 
485, 491 (1977); Linde, Advice to the Press, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb., 1979 at 
2; Note, supra note 120, at 191; Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the 
Inherent Powers of the Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 342, 344-45 n.13 (1977); Note, supra note 
96, at 86-87. 
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can't tell you what a prior restraint is but we know we don't 
like them." Courts should cease speaking of prior restraint in 
restrictive order opinions and instead ask whether the proce-
dure followed was protective enough to ensure fair and intelli-
gent decision and whether the order prohibits protected expres-
sion or conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The view that litigation is of interest only to the parties 
involved has lost ground in this age of government in the sun-
shine.187 Indeed, as Frank Allen said, "the central problem of 
criminal law is and will remain political in character. It is the 
problem of achieving the objectives of public order through the 
use of power so regulated as to preserve and nourish the basic 
political values."188 The press plays a significant role in the 
establishment of the criminal process as a part of the political 
sphere. 
This system, with all its procedural protections and legal 
rules, is put under great stress by the use of restrictive orders. 
Inflexible dogma occasionally intrudes in restrictive order anal-
ysis to prevent prompt decisions on the merits. The result dims 
the appearance of justice. More often, inapplicable lore clouds 
the reasoning process. 
Still, several developments have brought troubled areas 
into sharper focus. The courts, with the organized bar's help, 
have developed personal jurisdiction analysis and pre-order 
procedure; restrictive orders are now formulated in an adver-
sary crucible. Appellate courts have adopted extraordinary. 
writ appeals to restrictive orders. However, these developments 
do not leave us without problems. Appellate courts should re-
view restrictive orders promptly instead of writing an opinion 
after the controversy has become moot. Finally, applying prior 
restraint doctrine to review restrictive orders is one of the law's 
117 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 HARv. L. 
REv. 1281, 1283 (1976). See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829 (1978). [Ed. note: But see Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale: the majority opinion 
and Justice Rhenquist's concurring opinion rely on the parties to enforce the right to 
a public trial. The dissent disagrees, citing the victim's and the public's interest in 
preventing improper court procedure] • 
... F. ALLEN, THE BoRDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JusTICE viii (1964). 
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disaster areas. Courts cannot forge rational and socially respon-
sive restrictive order doctrine so long as they redact the faded 
pieties and failed metaphors of prior restraint. 

